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1. Introduction
Watermarking techniques are developed for the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights. They can be used in
various areas, including broadcast monitoring, proof of
ownership, transaction tracking, content authentication, and
copy control [1]. In the last two decades a number of
watermarking techniques have been developed [2–10]. The
requirement(s) that a particular watermarking scheme needs
to fulfill depend(s) on the application purpose(s). In this
paper, we focus on the authentication of images. In image
authentication, there are basically two main objectives: (i)
the verification of the image ownership and (ii) the detection
of any forgery of the original data. Specifically, in the
authentication, we check whether the embedded information
(i.e., the invisible watermark) has been altered or not in the
receiver side.
Fragile watermarking is a powerful image content aut-
hentication tool [1, 7, 8, 11]. It is used to detect any possible
change that may have occurred in the original image. A
fragile watermark is readily destroyed if the watermarked
image has been slightly modified. As an early work on image
authentication, Friedman proposed a trusted digital camera,
which embeds a digital signature for each captured image
[12]. In [13], Yeung andMintzer proposed an authentication
watermark that uses a pseudorandom sequence and a mod-
ified error diﬀusion method to protect the integrity of the
images.Wong andMemon proposed a secret and a public key
image watermarking scheme for authentication of grayscale
images [14]. A secure watermark based on chaotic sequence
was used for JPEG image authentication in [3]. A statistical
multiscale fragile watermarking approach based on a Gaus-
sian mixture model was proposed in [6]. Many more fragile
watermarking techniques can be found in the literature.
Most of the existing image watermarking methods are
based on either spatial domain techniques or frequency
domain techniques. Only few methods are based on a joint
spatial-frequency domain techniques [15, 16] or a joint time-
frequency domain techniques [9, 17]. The approach in [15]
uses the projections of the 2D Radon-Wigner distribution in
order to achieve the watermark detection. This watermarking
technique requires the knowledge of the Radon-Wigner
distribution of the original image in the detection process.
In [16], the watermark detection is based on the correlation
between the 2D STFT of the watermarked image and that
of the watermark image for each image pixel. In [9, 17],
the Wigner distribution of the image is added to the time-
frequency watermark. In this technique the detector requires
access to the Wigner distribution of the original image.
In this paper, we propose two diﬀerent private fragile
watermarking methods: the first one is based on a time-
frequency analysis, the other one is based on a time-scale
analysis. Firstly, in the time-frequency-based method the
fragile watermark consists of an arbitrary nonstationary
signal with a particular signature in the time-frequency
domain. The length (in samples) of the nonstationary signal,
used as a watermark, can be chosen equal up to the total
number of pixels in the image under consideration. That
is, for a given N1 × N2 image size, we are able to embed
a watermark signal of size less or equal to (N1 × N2)
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samples. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we
consider in the sequel a square image of size N × N and the
nonstationary signal of length N samples only. The locations
of the N image pixels used to embed the N watermark
samples can be chosen arbitrarily. In what follows, we choose
to embed the watermark in the N diagonal pixels of the
image. Alternative pixel locations can also be considered.
Moreover, a pseudonoise (PN) sequence can be used as a
secret key to modulate the watermark signal, making the
time-frequency signature harder to perceive or to modify. In
the extraction process, not all pixels of the original image
are needed to recover the watermark but only those N pixels
where the watermark has been embedded. Here, these N
original pixels are inserted in the watermarked image itself.
At the receiver, it is assumed that the legal user knows the
locations of the watermark samples as well as the locations of
the corresponding original pixels and the secret key (if used).
If, for any reason, the N original pixels are not inserted in
the watermarked image, they still need to be known by the
legal user for the detection purpose. Once the watermark is
extracted, its time-frequency representation is used to certify
the original ownership of the image and verify whether it has
been modified or not. If the watermarked image has been
attacked or modified, the time-frequency signature of the
extracted watermark would also be modified significantly, as
it will be shown in coming sections.
The second proposed fragile watermarking method,
based on wavelet analysis, uses complex chirp signals as
watermarks. The advantages of using complex chirp signals
as watermarks are manyfold, among these one can cite
(i) the wide frequency range of such signals making the
watermarking capacity very high and (ii) the easiness in
adjusting the FM/AM parameters to generate diﬀerent
watermarks. In this technique, the wavelet transformation
decomposes the host image hierarchically into a series of
successively lower resolution reference images and their
associated detail images. The low resolution image and the
detail images including the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal
details contain the information to reconstruct the reference
image of the next higher resolution level. The detection does
not require the original image, instead it uses the special
feature of the extracted complex chirp watermark signal for
content authentication.
Before concluding this section, we should observe that
due to its inherent hierarchical structure, the wavelet-based
watermarking method provides a higher level of security,
and a more precise localization of any tampering (that
may occur) in the watermarked image. On the other hand,
the advantage of the time-frequency-based watermarking
method, compared to the proposed time-scale one, lies in
its simplicity and its possibility to use a larger class of
nonstationary signals as watermarks.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we
give a brief review of time-frequency analysis, introduce the
time-frequency based watermarking method, and discuss its
performance through some selected examples. In Section 4,
we present a brief review of the discrete wavelet transform
and introduce the wavelet based watermarking method. In
Section 5, we discuss the performance of the second method
through two applications: the content integrity verification
with tamper localization capability and the quality assess-
ment of the watermarked image. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. Method I: Proposed Fragile Watermarking
Based on Time-Frequency Analysis
2.1. Brief Review of Time-Frequency Analysis. A given signal
can be represented in many ways; however, the most impor-
tant ones are time and frequency domain representations.
These two representations and their related classical methods
such as autocorrelation and/or power spectrum proved to
be powerful in the analysis of stationary signals. However,
when the signal is nonstationary these methods fail to
fully characterize it. The use of the joint time-frequency
representation gives us a better understanding in the analysis
of nonstationary signals. The ability of the time-frequency
distribution to display the spectral contents of a given
nonstationary signal makes it a very powerful tool in the
analysis of such signals [18]. As an illustration, let us
consider the analysis of a nonstationary signal consisting of a










a0t + a1t2 + a2t3
)]
, (1)
where ΠT(t) is 1 for |t| ≤ T/2 and zero elsewhere. a0, a1,
and a2 are real coeﬃcients. The signal spectrum, displayed
in the bottom plot of Figure 1, gives no indication on how
the frequency of the signal is changing with time. The time
domain representation, displayed in the left plot of Figure 1,
is also limited and does not provide full information
about the signal. However, a time-frequency representation,
displayed in the center plot of the same figure, clearly reveals
the quadratic relation between the frequency and time.
Note that, theoretically, we have an infinite number
of possibilities to generate a quadratic FM. This could be
accomplished by just choosing diﬀerent combinations of
values for a0, a1, and a2. In the sequel, we will select a
particular quadratic FM signal, with arbitrary start and stop
times, as a watermark for our application.We emphasize here
that other nonstationary signals are also feasible to choose
and select.
2.2. Watermark Embedding and Extraction. As stated earlier,
we can select one nonstationary signal, out of an infinite
number, as our watermark. It is the particular features of this
signal in the time-frequency domain that would be used to
identify the watermark and, consequently, its ownership. In
discrete-time domain, the selected watermark signal can be
written as
s(n) = cos[2π(a0n + a1n2 + a2n3)], n = 0, 1, . . . ,Nw − 1.
(2)
Here, we assume a unit sampling frequency. In what follows,
we set the signal length Nw equal to Nw = N = 256
where we assume, for simplicity, that N × N is the size of
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Figure 1: Time-frequency representation of a quadratic FM signal: the signal’s time domain representation appears on the left, and its
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Figure 2: The original unwatermarked image used in the analysis.
the image to be watermarked. In Figure 2, we display the
original unwatermarked baboon image used in our analysis.
Any arbitrary N pixels (out of the total N2 pixels) of the
image are potential candidates to hide the watermark. In this
presentation, we have chosen the main diagonal, from top
left to bottom right, pixels as the points of interest. That is,
each sample of the quadratic FM watermark signal is added
to a diagonal image pixel. Note that if we choose to use
the secret key, the watermark signal is first multiplied by
the PN sequence and, then, added to the original diagonal
pixels. Also note that in some cases, the watermark signal
may have to be scaled by a real number before it is added
to the original pixels. However, in our examples, we have
found that a unitary scale coeﬃcient is adequate to perform
the task. The watermarked image is displayed in Figure 3.
We observe that there is no apparent diﬀerence between the
marked and unmarked images. In addition, the watermark is
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Figure 3: Watermarked image.
We stress again that (i) the number of image pixels
used to embed the watermark signal samples, and (ii) their
locations in the original image can be chosen arbitrarily.
Indeed, we can choose to embed all image pixels by just
selecting an equal number of samples for the watermark
signal. However, this number and the corresponding pixels
locations used must be known to the legal user of the data.
To extract the watermark, we need to remove the
quadratic FM samples from the diagonal pixels of the
watermarked image. For that, we need the values of the
original image pixels at those particular positions. These
original pixels should be known to a legal user. They could be
transmitted independently or they can be transmitted in the
watermarked image itself. For instance, in the watermarked
image in Figure 3, we have inserted these original pixels in
the watermarked image. We have done this by augmenting
the watermarked image to an image of size N × (N + 1)
and allocated the upper diagonal whose elements are indexed
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Figure 4: Reduced-interference distribution of a multicomponent
signal consisting of 2 quadratic FM components (with opposite
instantaneous frequencies).
by (i, i + 1), i = 1, . . . ,N to contain the required original
pixels. Obviously, any other N locations (in the watermarked
image) can alternatively be used to insert the original N
pixels. Similarly, if the PN sequence is used, it should also
be known to the legal user at the receiving end in order to
extract the watermark. This sequence can also be transmitted
independently or hidden in the watermark itself (using a
similar procedure to the one used for the needed original
pixels). Once, we have extracted the watermark samples, we
use a time-frequency distribution (TFD) to analyse their
content.
In the literature, we can find many TFDs. The choice
of a particular one depends on the specific application at
hand and the representation properties that are suitable
for this application. Since we select a monocomponent
quadratic FM signal as the watermark (refer to Figure 1),
thus, we can clearly and unambiguously recognise our time-
frequency signature by simply using a windowed Wigner-
Ville distribution (WVD) of the signal. The windowedWVD


















e− j2π f τdτ, (3)
where z(t) is the analytic signal associated with the water-
mark signal s(t) and w(τ) is the considered window. If we
decide to use a more complex watermark signal such as
the multicomponent signal displayed in Figure 4, the WVD
would not be appropriate as it would have cross-terms which
might hide the actual feature of our signature. In this case,
a reduced interference TFD is more appropriate to use [19,
20]. The watermarking procedure used for multicomponent
signals is similar to that used for monocomponent signals.
Consequently, one can select any arbitrary pattern in the
time-frequency domain as a signature without any additional
computational load compared to the illustrative quadratic
FM signal used in our examples.
3. Results and Performance for Method I
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
fragile watermarkingmethod. For that, we consider the time-
frequency analysis of the extracted watermark when the
watermarked image has been subjected to some common
attacks such as cropping, scaling, translation, rotation, and
JPEG compression.
For the cropping, we choose to crop only the first row of
pixels of the watermarked image (leaving all the other rows
untouched); for the scaling we choose the factor value 1.1; for
the translation we choose to translate the whole watermarked
image by only 1 column to the right; for the rotation we
rotate the whole watermarked image by 1 deg anticlockwise;
for the compression we choose a JPEG compression at quality
level equal to 99%. Visually, the eﬀect of these attacks on
the watermarked image is unnoticeable. This is because the
chosen values are very close to the values 1 (i.e., no scaling),
0 (i.e., no translation), 1 deg (i.e., slight rotation), and 100%
(i.e., no compression). For space limitations, the various
attacked watermarked images are not shown here (they look
very similar to the unattacked watermarked image displayed
in Figure 3).
Before presenting the results that correspond to the
images subjected to attacks, let us present here the TFD of
the extracted watermark when there has been no attack. In
Figure 5(a), we display the TFD of the extracted watermark
when the PN has not been dealt with yet and in Figure 5(b)
we display the TFD of the extracted watermark after we
decode the watermark using the correct PN code. It is clear
from these two figures that any attempt by an illegal user
to identify the owner of the image from the TFD without
knowing the correct PN code (i.e., the secret key) would not
be possible.
In the following examples, we have not used the PN
sequence in the watermarking process in order to focus on
the eﬀects of the attacks only (we obtained similar results
when the PN is used). From each attacked image, we extract
the watermark signal, as discussed in the previous section,
and analyze it using a windowed WVD. The results of this
operation are shown in Figure 6. These TFDs are drastically
distorted in comparison with the TFD of the watermark
signal extracted from the unattacked watermarked image
(see Figure 5(b)).
Although the plots in Figure 6 show the visual impact of
the considered attacks on the watermark time-frequency rep-
resentations, they do not quantify the amount of distortion
caused to the watermark or image. To quantify the distortion,
we need to evaluate the similarity, expressed in terms of the
normalized correlation coeﬃcient, r, between the TFD of the
extracted watermark and that of the original watermark. We









where w is obtained by reshaping the 2D TFD of the original
watermark into a 1D sequence from which we remove its
mean value. w′ is obtained in a similar way from the TFD
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Figure 5: TFDs of the extracted watermark with no attack: (a) before removing the PN eﬀect and (b) after removing the PN eﬀect.
of the extracted watermark. p is the total number of time-
frequency points in the respective TFDs under consideration.
The value of r belongs to the interval [−1,1], and is equal to
unity if the TFD of the extracted watermark and that of the
original watermark are exactly the same. Table 1 displays the
values of r that correspond to the attacks considered earlier.
These values are quite low, indicating that the proposed
watermarking scheme is very sensitive to the small changes
that may result from various types of attacks.
It is worth observing that any attack on the watermarked
image that (i) does not aﬀect any of the pixels where the
watermark signal is embedded and, in addition, (ii) does
not result in the relocation of any of these embedded pixels
from its original position when it was watermarked, will not
be detected at the receiver end. However, this situation can
be easily avoided by increasing the watermark nonstationary
signal length to watermark a larger number of the original
image pixels. As stated above, the length of the watermark
signal can be chosen equal up to the total number of the
pixels of the unwatermarked original image.
4. Method II: Proposed Fragile Watermarking
Based on Time-Scale Analysis
In this proposed fragile multiresolution watermarking
scheme a complex FM chirp signal will be embedded, using
a wavelet analysis, in the original image.
A discrete wavelet transform is used to decompose the
original image into a series of successively lower resolution
reference images and their associated detail images. The low-
resolution image and the detail images, including the hori-
zontal, vertical, and diagonal details, contain the information
needed to reconstruct the reference image at the next higher
resolution level.
4.1. Brief Review of the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT).
The two-dimensional DWT, of a dyadic decomposition type,
Table 1: Similarity measure between the TFD of the original water-
mark and that of the extracted watermark, when the watermarked
image is subjected to various attacks.
Type of Attack Correlation coeﬃcient, r




JPEG (QF = 99%) 0.2027
























LL (2n1 − i1, 2n2 − i2),
(5)
where h(i) represents the low-pass filter, g(i) the high-pass
filter, J the DWT decomposition level, and x0LL the input
image with (i1, i2) ∈ [0, . . . , 15].
Figure 7 illustrates a two-level wavelet decomposition of
Lena image. Here, (LL) represents the low frequency band,
(HH) the high frequency band, (LH) the low-high frequency
band, and (HL) the high-low frequency band. For image
quality purpose, the frequency bands (LL) and (HH) are not
suitable to use in the watermarking process [22].
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Figure 6: TFDs of the extracted watermark for (a) a JPEG compression attack, (b) a scaling attack (factor 1.1) (c) a translation attack, (d) a
rotation attack (1◦ rotation), and (e) a cropping attack.







Figure 7: A two-level wavelet decomposition of the Lena image.













Figure 8: The block diagram of the proposed wavelet-based watermarking technique.
4.2. Proposed Multiresolution Watermark Embedding Scheme.
Figure 8 displays a block diagram of the proposed multires-
olution watermarking technique. The various steps of this
technique are described below.
Step 1 (discrete wavelet transform of the original image). A
level l (in the following analysis we use l = 3) DWT of the
original image I is performed using Harr bases. The obtained
wavelet coeﬃcients are denoted as C.
Step 2 (generation of the watermark bits). Every value of the
real part, ai, and every value of the imaginary part, bi, of the
unitary amplitude watermark complex sample, si = ai + jbi,
is quantized into an integer value from 0 to 127. Each of
the quantization values is digitally coded using a 7-bit digital
code.
Specifically, a given real part value ai, is digitally coded
into a 7-bit code labeled ain, where n represents one of the
7 digit positions in this 7-bit code (i.e., n takes of the values
from 1 to 7). In a similar way, a given imaginary part value
bi, is digitally coded into a 7-bit code labeled bin.
Step 3 (generation of the key). A random sequence is
generated and used to randomly select the various image
pixels to be used in the watermarking process.
Step 4 (procedure to embed the watermark). The embedding
of a particular watermark bit 0 or 1 is based on the QIM
quantization technique [23]. To elaborate more, let us denote
the lth level wavelet coeﬃcient of the original image as
Ck,l(p, q), where the subscript k = h stands for horizontal
detail coeﬃcient, k = v stands for vertical detail coeﬃcient,
l = 1, . . . , 3, and (p, q) are the indices of the spatial location
under consideration. Note that for an image of size (256 ×
256), (p, q) ∈ [1, . . . , 128] for l = 1, whereas (p, q) ∈
[1, . . . , 64] for l = 2 and (p, q) ∈ [1, . . . , 32] for l = 3,
respectively. In order to embed a watermark sample consists
of a real part and an imaginary part with 7 bits, we consider
an image block of size (16 × 8). An illustrative example is
shown in Figure 9 to embed 7 bits of both the real and
imaginary parts of a watermark sample at diﬀerent levels.
As we see in Figure 9, the first bit or the most significant
bit (MSB) is embedded in the third level (l = 3), second
and third bits are embedded in the second level (l = 2)
and the last four bits are used to embed at level one (l
= 1). The HL and LH bands are selected for watermark
embedding as illustrated in Figure 9 and the corresponding
wavelet coeﬃcient is mapped into a value 0 or 1, according
to the quantization function Q(·) given by [23] (refer to




0 if zΔ ≤ C < (z + 1)Δ for z = 0,±2, . . . ,
1 if zΔ ≤ C < (z + 1)Δ for z = ±1,±3, . . . ,
(6)
where Δ is a pre-selected quantization step. In practice,
the quantization step Δ needs to be adjusted according
to the requirements of the image quality. Smaller values
of Δ result in higher peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR)
of the watermarked image and consequently, the higher
image quality. Lastly, the watermarked wavelet coeﬃcients
are obtained in the following way. If Q(C(i)) = w(i) then


























Figure 9: A pair of clusters of wavelet coeﬃcients for embedding a pair of ith watermark samples of ain and bin, n = 1, 2, . . . , 7.
0
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Figure 10: The quantization procedure of a given wavelet coeﬃ-
cient.
no change in this wavelet coeﬃcient C(i) is necessary; that is,
the watermarked wavelet coeﬃcient C˜(i) is
C˜(i) = C(i). (7)
If Q(C(i)) /=w(i), the wavelet coeﬃcient C(i) is then shifted
to its nearest neighboring quantization step as given by









where the operation “round(·)” is to round the element
to the nearest integer towards positive infinity. The water-
marked wavelet coeﬃcients are then dispersed using the
generated key.
Step 5 (inverse wavelet transform). The final watermarked
image X is obtained by an inverse DWT of C˜, using Harr
bases.
4.3. An Illustrative Example. To illustrate the validity of
the above proposed method, we consider to watermark a
Lena image. In this example, we use a level 3 DWT. The
quantization steps selected here are the same as those used in
[23]. Specifically, we setΔ = 16, 8, 4 for l = 3, 2, 1, respectively.
The result of the operation is displayed in Figure 11.
We recall here that the quality of the watermarked
image depends on the choice of the quantization step Δ.
The smaller the value of Δ, the higher the PSNR of the
watermarked image [24]. For an original image, I(n1,n2) and
its watermarked image, W(n1,n2), with 255 gray levels, the
PSNR is defined as [24]












In our Lena example, the PSNR of the watermarked
image displayed in Figure 11(b) is found to be equal to
45.97 dB.
4.4. Watermark Extraction and Performance Against Attacks
4.4.1. Watermark Extraction Procedure. This section presents
the procedure to extract the watermark at the receiver end.
We observe that the extraction procedure is blind. That is,
neither the original unwatermarked image nor the original
watermark are required in the extraction and verification
stages. However, the legal user needs to know the key used
in the random permutation for the embedding locations, the
wavelet type, the values of the quantization parameter Δ, and
the quantization function Q(·) [23].
Figure 12 displays a block diagram of the watermark
extraction and verification procedure. The various steps of
this procedure are outlined below.
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Figure 12: A block diagram illustrating the watermark extraction and verification procedure.
Step 1 (DWT of the received image). The received image
denoted as X′, could be the watermarked image X or the
watermarked image altered by attacks. A level l (the same as
that used in the embedding process) DWT of the received
image X′ is performed using Harr bases. The resulting
wavelet coeﬃcients are denoted as C˜′.
Step 2 (Extraction of the watermark bits). Based on the
watermark embedding locations provided by the key, each
of the wavelet coeﬃcients, obtained in Step 1, is quantized
into the symbol “0” or “1”, using the same quantization
function employed during the embedding process, namely,
(6). The extracted watermark bits {w′(i) ∈ (a′in, b′in)} are,
then, extracted from odd and even quantization of the above






where a′in and b
′
in are the extracted real part and imaginary
part of the complex watermark signal sample at time instant
n.
The extracted watermark bits are used to reconstruct the

















Without resorting to the original watermark, the image
content authentication can be performed by simply evaluat-
ing the magnitude of the extracted chirp watermark signal.
This magnitude should be constant and equal to unity since
our original watermark is an FM complex chirp signal with
magnitude that is equal to one.
4.4.2. Performance Against Attacks. Here, we investigate the
sensitivity of the proposed watermarking scheme for the
following attack scenarios:
(i) JPEG compression of quality factors 90%, 80%, 70%,
60%, 50%, and 40%;
(ii) histogram equalization (uniform distortion);
(iii) sharpening (low-pass filtering)—processed by Adobe
Photoshop 7.0;
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Table 2: Bit error rate (BER) values of the extracted watermarks
obtained for the JPEG compression attacks for various values of the
quality factor (QF), and at each DWT level l.
Example: Lena image
QF l = 3 l = 2 l = 1
90% 0 0.0728 0.4587
80% 0.0068 0.1880 0.4802
70% 0.0313 0.2847 0.4832
60% 0.0781 0.3413 0.5034
50% 0.1357 0.4214 0.4995
40% 0.2168 0.4634 0.4978
Table 3: Bit error rate (BER) values of the extracted watermarks
obtained for other types of attacks, and at each DWT level l.
Attacks
Example: Lena image
l = 3 l = 2 l = 1
No attacks 0 0 0
Histogram equalization 0 0.0728 0.4587
Sharpening 0.0068 0.1880 0.4802
Blurring 0.0313 0.2847 0.4832
Gaussian noise 0.0781 0.3413 0.5034
Salt-and-pepper noise 0.1357 0.4214 0.4995
(iv) blurring (high-pass filtering)—processed by Adobe
Photoshop 7.0;
(v) additive Gaussian noise (variance = 0.01);
(vi) Salt-and-pepper noise (This type of noise is typically
seen on images with impulse noise model and
represents itself as randomly occurring white and
black pixels with value set to 255 or 0, resp.).
Specifically, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed watermarking technique by considering the extraction
of the watermark from the watermarked Lena image in
Figure 11(b), when subjected to each of the above attacks.
The performance is measured in terms of the bit-error-rate




where Ne is the number of bits in error and Nw is the total
number of watermark bits used in the watermarking process.
In our Lena example, we used a level 3 DWT; conse-
quently, the BER of the extracted watermark of all three
wavelet decomposition levels are evaluated. In Table 2 we
provide the obtained BER values for the diﬀerent JPEG
compressions attacks, and in Table 3 we provide the BER
values that correspond to the other types of attacks.
In addition, we have evaluated the PSNR of the distorted
watermarked image for each of the attacks stated above. The
results are summarized in Table 4.
We note that the watermark embedded in a higher
decomposition level (low frequency band) has better resis-
tance against distortions. Also, note that the embedded
Table 4: Peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) values (in dB) of
the distorted watermarked Lena image when subjected to various
attacks.
Attacks Example: Lena image
JPEG comp. 90% 38.83
JPEG comp. 80% 35.94
JPEG comp. 70% 34.41
JPEG comp. 60% 33.34
JPEG comp. 50% 32.56






watermark can be fully recovered without any bit error when
there is no attack.
5. Performance Study for Method II
In this section we demonstrate the performance of the
wavelet-based watermarking method through two appli-
cations. In the first application we study the content
integrity verification with localization capability. In the
second application, we study the quality assessment of the
watermarked content by investigating the extracted complex
chirp watermark in the absence of the original watermark.
5.1. Content Integrity Verification without Resorting to the
Original Watermark. Here we present how to check the
integrity of the watermarked image content, and how to
localize any tamper in the image, without knowing the orig-
inal watermark. Specifically, our aim is to detect and locate
any malicious change, such as feature adding, cropping, and
replacement that may have occurred in the watermarked
image. The detection is performed by simply extracting the
watermark complex chirp signal and, then, evaluating its
magnitude. Recall that this magnitude should be constant
and equal to unity if the watermarked image has not been
subjected to any attack.
As an illustration, consider a Lena image of 256 × 256
pixels. The Lena image is virtually partitioned into blocks of
size 16 × 8 pixels each. The resulting 512 blocks are labeled
from 1 to 512 in a columnwise order, as shown in Figure 13.
The watermark complex signal length is chosen equal to 512
samples. Each of these is embedded (using our proposed
scheme) in one of the 512 image blocks; whereby, the upper
8 × 8 pixels of the block are used to embed the sample real
part and the lower 8 × 8 pixels of the block are used to
embed the sample imaginary part. Note that, for simplicity
and illustrative purpose, we assume here that no random
permutation key is used.
If no alteration occurs in the watermarked image, the
detector after processing the image by blocks of size 16 × 8
pixels each, would yield for each block a watermark sample of



































Figure 13: Virtual partitioning of a Lena image of size 256 × 256
pixels into blocks of size 16 × 8 pixels each, and indexed from 1 to
512 in a columnwise order.






























Figure 14: Magnitudes of watermark samples obtained for each
of the 512 blocks, when no alteration occurs in the received
watermarked image.
magnitude almost equal to one. Figure 14 displays the result
of the detection operation for our example. As expected, the
magnitude of each sample is approximately equal to unity.
Now we assume that the Lena image has been subjected
to an attack. First, we consider that the attack has occurred
in one single block. Then, we generalize the assumption to
multiple blocks.
5.1.1. Tamper in a Single Authentication Block. Here, we
assume that the watermarked Lena image is altered in only
one pixel. Specifically, we assume that the value of the pixel
located at (135, 138) has been changed from 196 to 0, as
shown in Figure 15.
The pixel under consideration belongs to the 16 ×
8 authentication block with index 281, as illustrated in
Figure 16.
Figure 15: A tampered watermarked Lena image. The pixel value
















Figure 16: Position of the altered pixel in the watermarked image.
The detector response in this case presents a magnitude
value diﬀerent from unity at the block index 281, as shown
in Figure 17. This is an indication that an alteration has
occurred at this specific block location of the watermarked
image.
5.1.2. Tampers in Multiple Authentication Blocks. Here, we
assume that the watermarked Lena image is altered in more
than one authentication blocks.
Assume that the mouth region of the watermarked Lena
image has been deliberately replaced by a diﬀerent mouth
image. The result of this operation is shown in Figure 18(a).
Figure 18(b) displays the region (i.e., the mouth region)
where the alteration occurred.
As we can see, it is diﬃcult to pinpoint, at the naked eye,
to the exact block locations where the alteration occurred
in Figure 18(a). However, our detector as can be seen
in Figure 19(a), is able to indicate the indexes of all ten
authentication blocks that are in error. These block indexes,
12 EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing






























Figure 17: Magnitudes of watermark samples obtained for each
of the 512 blocks, when an alteration occurs in one block of the
received watermarked image.
Table 5: Quality assessment using the mean square error (MSE)
and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the extracted watermark
signal, when the watermarked Lena image is JPEG compressed,
using various compression quality factor values.
JPEG Comp. Actual PSNR Quality Assessment
(QF) (dB) MSE SNR (dB)
100% 45.97 2.0025 ×10−5 46.98
99% 45.35 5.1460 ×10−4 32.89
98% 44.41 0.0014 28.69
95% 41.53 0.0101 19.95
90% 38.83 0.0267 15.74
80% 35.94 0.0641 11.93
70% 34.41 0.0956 10.19
60% 33.34 0.1061 9.74
50% 32.56 0.1227 9.11
given by 267, 268, 283, 284, 299, 300, 315, 316, 331, and 332,
exactly match the indexes of the blocks that we deliberately
modified earlier. The positions and indexes of the altered
blocks are shown in Figure 19(b).
5.2. Quality Assessment of the Proposed Method II. In this
section, we discuss the quality assessment of the received
watermarked image, when subjected to various attacks.
Ideally, the magnitude of each extracted watermark sample
is equal to unity; however, in practice, the actual value is
diﬀerent from one due to the possible manipulations of the
watermarked image content. This point is well illustrated in
Figure 20.
We evaluate the level of distortion of the attacked water-
marked image by evaluating the mean square error (MSE)
between the actual magnitude of the extracted watermark
Table 6: Quality assessment using the mean square error (MSE)
and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the extracted watermark





Histogram equalization 0.1282 8.92
Sharpening 0.1038 9.84
Blurring 0.1062 9.74
Gaussian noise 0.1202 9.20
Salt-and-pepper noise 0.0926 10.34
signal and its original value (i.e., unity). Mathematically, the







where mag′(i) denotes the magnitude of the ith extracted
watermark sample, and Nw is the number of watermark
samples embedded in the image.
Equivalently we can evaluate, in (dB), the quality mea-
sure of the distortion, in terms of the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) as follows:






Note that the further is the extracted watermark signal
from the original watermark one, the larger is the value of
the MSE, and, consequently, the smaller is the value of the
SNR.
Table 5 summarizes the results, when the watermarked
Lena image (refer to Figure 11) is subjected to JPEG com-
pression for various quality factor values. As expected, we
observe that the MSE increases (i.e., SNR decreases) with
decreasing quality factor values.
In the same table, we also show the PSNR values obtained
in this case. These values confirm the degradation of the
attacked image with decreasing JPEG quality factor.
We note that theMSE obtained for the JPEG compression
quality factor 100% (i.e., no attack) is nonzero. This is due
to the quantization noise (refer to earlier sections), and can
be reduced by reducing the quantization step used in the
watermarking procedure.
Table 6 summarizes the results when the image is sub-
jected to other attacks. The corresponding PSNR values (in
dB) for these attacks were already given in Table 4. We note
that the amount of image content degradation increases with
increasing MSE values (i.e., decreasing SNR values).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed two fragile watermarking meth-
ods for still images. The first method uses time-frequency
analysis and the second one uses time-scale analysis. In
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Figure 18: (a) A tampered watermarked Lena image, and (b) the region around the mouth indicates where the alteration occurred (a).
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Figure 19: (a) The detector response after analysis of Figure 18(a) (“◦” indicates the indexes of the blocks aﬀected by the alteration). (b)






























Figure 20: Ideal and actual magnitudes of the extracted watermark
signal.
the first method, the watermark consists of an arbitrary
nonstationary signal with a particular signature in the time-
frequency plane. This method can allow the use of a secret
key to enhance the security and privacy. To verify the image
ownership and to check whether it has been subjected
to any attack, we exploit the particular signature of the
watermark in the time-frequency domain. The advantages of
this method are twofold: (i) we can detect any change that
results from an attack such as rotation, scaling, translation,
and compression and (ii) the watermarked image quality
is retained quite high because only few pixels of the
original image are used in the watermarking process. In
the second proposed method, an arbitrary complex FM
signal is embedded in the wavelet domain. This method
was shown to be very eﬀective, in terms of sensitivity
of the hidden fragile watermark, when the watermarked
image is subjected to various attacks. A nice feature of
this second method is that the watermark extraction is
performed without the need for the original watermark. Two
potential applications are presented to demonstrate the high
performance of this proposed method. The first application
14 EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
deals with a content integrity verification without restoring
to the original watermark and the second application deals
with a blind quality assessment of the received watermarked
image.
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